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Abstract
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study competitions for power — and
the role of patronage in such competitions. We construct and analyze a new game —
the “chicken-and-egg game” — in which chickens correspond to positions of power
and eggs are the game’s currency. We find that power tends to accumulate, through a
“power begets power” dynamic, in the hands of “lords.” Other subjects behave like
their vassals in the sense that they take lords’ handouts rather than compete against
them. We observe substantial wealth inequality as well as power inequality. There
are also striking gender differences in outcomes — particularly in rates of lordship.
In a second treatment, where we eliminate patronage by knocking out the ability to
transfer eggs, inequality is vastly reduced and the “power begets power” dynamic
disappears.
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1 Introduction
There are many real-world settings where agents compete for power: such as govern-
ment, firms, and criminal enterprises. Winning such competitions requires a base of sup-
port; and such support is often obtained through patronage. Take Tammany Hall, for
instance, which courted New York’s newly arrived immigrants with jobs, social services,
firewood, and coal. Likewise, the Medici plied Florence’s prominent families with gener-
ous loans and sweetheart business deals; and gained favor with the general citizenry by
building churches, giving to the arts, and distributing food to the poor.1 This paper uses
a laboratory experiment to study competitions for power — and the role of patronage in
such competitions.
We construct and analyze a new game — the “chicken-and-egg game” — in which
agents compete for power and can engage in patronage. In this game, (finitely-lived)
chickens correspond to (finitely-tenured) positions of power and the eggs laid by chickens
are the game’s currency. The game is played by a group of subjects over multiple rounds.
Each round, an election takes place to determine the owner of a newborn chicken. Each
subject chooses whether to be a voter or run in the election as a candidate.2 Prior to voting,
candidates can pledge eggs from their existing stock of chickens to voters in return for
their votes.
We run the chicken-and-egg game in the laboratory with groups of six subjects, who
play for thirty rounds. Seven main results emerge.
First, power distributes unequally — and tends to accumulate in a single person’s
hands. The number of chickens reaches a steady state in round 6; from that point on, we
refer to subjects who own at least 80 percent of chickens as “lords.” Lords are extremely
common, arising in 40 percent of all rounds. Other subjects, furthermore, tend to behave
like their vassals — in the sense that they take lords’ handouts the majority of the time,
rather than run or vote against them.
Second, lords’ power is relatively stable. 53 percent of lord tenures are 9 rounds or
1See Golway (2014) on Tammany Hall and Hibbert (1974) on the Medici.
2Our experiment therefore relates to the literature on citizen-candidate models (see Osborne and Slivinski,
1996 and Besley and Coate, 1997).
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more. The average lord tenure is 10.1 rounds.
The emergence and stability of lords reflects a basic force at work in our setting that
tends to concentrate power: powerful subjects (i.e., those with chickens) can pledge eggs
to voters, which helps them win elections and amass more power. We estimate that win-
ning an election increases the chances of winning future elections by anywhere from 12.4
to 16.6 percent.3
Third, lords’ power is not perfectly stable. 24.9 percent of lord tenures are 4 rounds or
less. In 52 percent of groups where a lord emerges, the first lord is toppled and replaced
by another lord.
The fragility of lords reflects the presence of a countervailing force that tends to dis-
perse power: a preference among voters for underdogs. We find that, after controlling
for pledge size, candidates with more chickens receive fewer votes. Our post-experiment
survey suggests that voters favor underdogs in part because they care about equity, and
in part out of a desire to induce competitive elections, in which candidates have a strong
incentive to pledge eggs.
Fourth, we observe substantial wealth inequality as well as power inequality. The
wealthiest group member ends the game with 35.5 percent of all eggs on average. While
there is considerable wealth inequality, it is less pronounced than power inequality be-
cause the powerful transfer eggs to the less powerful. Lords, for instance, give away 28.4
percent of their eggs on average. Such generosity may be a response to voters’ propensity
to topple lords — especially those who are stingy.
Fifth, some groups are substantially more unequal in power and wealth than others.
For instance, in the top quintile of groups — as ranked by their wealth Gini coefficients
— the wealthiest subject acquires 52.6 percent of total wealth, compared to 22.6 percent
in the bottom quintile. We suspect that group differences are driven by different norms
regarding what is fair. In line with this view, subjects in low-inequality groups vote for
underdogs more often and report greater concern with equity in our post-experiment
survey.
3Relatedly, there is an empirical literature that measures incumbency advantage in various electoral set-
tings. For example, Ansolabehere et al. (2000) estimate a 7-10% incumbency advantage in 1980s and 1990s
US House elections (see also Gelman and King, 1990 and Levitt and Wolfram, 1997).
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Sixth, in a second treatment, where we eliminate patronage by knocking out the ability
to pledge eggs, inequality almost vanishes. Lords never arise and the wealthiest group
member captures a much smaller share of the surplus (20.4 percent of all eggs, on average,
compared to 35.5 percent in the baseline). Furthermore, we do not see a “power begets
power” dynamic. In contrast to the baseline, winning an election does not increase the
chances of winning subsequent elections — in fact, it slightly reduces the chances.
Finally, in our baseline treatment, there are striking gender differences in outcomes.
Women are less powerful and less wealthy. In the tail of the distribution, the differences
are particularly dramatic. For instance, women are lords only 32 percent as often as men.
These differences in outcomes come about because of small gender differences in style of
play, which are compounded by the game’s “power begets power” dynamic.4
2 Literature Review
Most closely related to our paper is Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory of the evolution of
political institutions (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005, 2012). Acemoglu and Robinson
(hereafter, AR) argue that political institutions determine the distribution of economic
resources; and economic resources allow agents to shape future political institutions. A
vicious cycle can develop where wealthy agents use their resources to amass power; they
use their power, in turn, to amass more wealth.5 Consequently, power and wealth can
become concentrated in the hands of a few. A version of AR’s vicious cycle arises in our
baseline treatment.6
Altering one feature of our experiment — the ability to engage in patronage — elimi-
nates vicious cycles. This finding is in line with AR’s emphasis on “good institutions” as
bulwarks against vicious cycles — and suggests that an effective way to reduce inequality
4We can attribute gender differences in outcomes to style-of-play differences — rather than gender discrim-
ination — because subjects do not know the genders of other participants.
5Zingales (2017) makes a similar argument, with particular reference to political rent-seeking by large firms.
Glaeser et al. (2003), likewise, point out that subversion of institutions by the wealthy — specifically, the
courts — can exacerbate inequality.
6Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory fits into a broader literature on institutions as a driver of growth and a
determinant of inequality. See, for instance, Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), Rodrik et al. (2004), La Porta et al.
(2008); for a review of the literature, see Acemoglu et al. (2005).
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may be to curtail patronage systems. The United States, for instance, introduced a series
of reforms which were successful in addressing patronage: most notably, the Pendleton
Act of 1883, which established a Civil Service Commission, and the Hatch Act of 1939
which forbid bribery of voters and restricted the political activity of government officials.
Importantly, while we allow certain institutions in our experiment to evolve (i.e., who
holds power), we take others as fixed. In particular, we impose democratic elections. In so
doing, we suppress a force that AR highlight as exacerbating vicious cycles: democratic
institutions tend to erode when power and wealth are concentrated.7 Even absent this
force, we observe vicious cycles — an outcome that Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) refer
to as “captured democracy.”
The literature on clientelism is also concerned with vote buying by politicians (see
Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Stokes, 2011; Wantchekon, 2003; and Robinson and Verdier,
2013 for a review of the literature). Issues that have been studied include (1) whether
politicians buy votes from marginal or core supporters; (2) the policy consequences of
clientelism; and (3) why clientelism is associated with poverty and inequality. Our ex-
periment contributes to this literature by showing how clientelism can, over time, lead to
concentration of power.
Our paper, of course, fits into an experimental literature on elections (see Palfrey, 2006
for a review). Topics studied include voter turnout, strategic voting, and candidate com-
petition. Our experiment is the first, to our knowledge, to focus on political evolution and
vicious cycles.
Finally, we contribute to a literature on inequality, where small differences in initial
endowments can lead to large differences in outcomes. For instance, Frank and Cook
(2010) argue that the emergence of winner-take-all markets has magnified differences
in wealth between stars and other market competitors. Piketty (2014) suggests that a
7Take, as an example, the newly formed republics of postcolonial Latin America — many of which modeled
themselves explicitly on the United States, adopting presidentialism, bicameral legislatures, and supreme
courts. Vicious cycles, nonetheless, led to the emergence of autocrats in most cases — such as Pero´n in
Argentina and Getu´lio Vargas in Brazil — who eroded democratic institutions (see, Levitsky and Ziblatt,
2018, Chapter 5). Pero´n, for instance, came to power through vote buying and dispensing political favors.
Once in power, he packed the courts with loyal judges who helped keep him in power: by upholding, for
example, the conviction of Ricardo Balbı´n, the leader of the main opposition party (see, Acemoglu and
Robinson (2012), p. 330).
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“capital begets capital” process can lead to the entrenchment of a rentier class. Cunha
and Heckman (2007) make a “skills beget skills” argument: because of dynamic comple-
mentaries in skill formation, small differences in early childhood education can lead to
large disparities in later outcomes. Akerlof and Holden (2016) develop a theory in which
“social connections beget social connections,” leading to the emergence of “movers and
shakers” who command large rents. In our paper, inequality stems from a “power begets
power” dynamic. Powerful “lords” emerge who play an outsize role in determining the
distribution of income.
3 Experimental Design
Subjects in our experiment played a version of the “chicken-and-egg game.” The game
was played in groups of six over thirty rounds. Subjects were randomly allocated to
groups and groups were assigned to either a “baseline treatment” or a “no pledge” treat-
ment. All choices in the game were publicly observable; to preserve anonymity, subjects
were given pseudonyms.
Baseline Treatment
In each round of the game, except the final one, an election takes place. The election
winner is awarded a chicken, which lays two eggs per round for the next five rounds —
or until the end of the game — and then “retires.” Eggs are the game’s currency and are
converted to cash at the end of the experiment.
The outcome of each election is determined by a randomly-selected deciding voter.
Candidates can pledge to give some of their eggs to the deciding voter if they win. Elec-
tions proceed as follows.
1. Each subject decides whether to be a candidate or a voter. The list of candidates is
then publicly announced. In the event that there are no candidates — or no voters
— the computer randomly allocates the chicken.
2. Candidates choose how many eggs to pledge to the deciding voter. Candidates
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can only pledge eggs out of their stock of “fresh eggs” (i.e., eggs laid in the current
round). Candidates’ pledges are then publicly announced.
3. Voters simultaneously cast votes for candidates. These votes are then made public,
and the computer randomly (and publicly) selects a “deciding voter” whose vote
determines the election winner.
4. Finally, the election winner gives the pledged amount to the deciding voter. Subjects
keep the eggs that they do not give away and accumulate them over the course of
the experiment.
In the final round, subjects simply collect the eggs laid by their chickens.
No-Pledge Treatment
The no-pledge treatment differs from the baseline in only one respect: candidates do not
have the option to make pledges.
Procedural Details
The experiment was conducted at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore be-
tween August 2018 and September 2019 and was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher,
2007). Subjects were recruited by email from the undergraduate population. A total of
456 subjects participated in the experiment over 21 sessions.8
At the start of the experiment, subjects received written instructions, which were also
read aloud, and played two non-incentivized practice rounds. At the end of the experi-
ment, subjects were asked to complete a non-incentivized survey about their motivations
during the experiment.9
Subjects’ eggs were converted to Singapore dollars at the rate of 5 eggs to $1. Subjects
also received a $5 show-up fee. The experiment lasted about 90 minutes and subjects
earned an average of $14.30.
8Randomization into treatments took place at the session level. There were 15 baseline-treatment sessions
and 6 no-pledge-treatment sessions. Each session contained at least 3 groups (18 participants).
9In our first three baseline-treatment sessions, subjects received a different survey with more open-ended
questions. The results we report in the paper come from the later version of the survey.
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Discussion
We will now take a moment to highlight several features of our design.
Elections. Power is acquired in our experiment through elections, so it is natural to
think of the experiment as speaking to the democratic process. We like to think of voting
in our experiment, though, as simply an act of fealty or support. Under this interpre-
tation, the experiment speaks to a wide range of settings — not just those where power
is contested through formal elections. The experiment might also speak, for instance, to
military conflicts between warlords or power struggles within gangs.
Only fresh eggs can be used to make pledges. In our baseline treatment, only fresh eggs
(eggs laid in the current round) can be used to make pledges. Consequently, power (chick-
ens) — rather than wealth (eggs) — is what determines a subject’s ability to pledge. This
design choice highlights that many common forms of patronage (e.g., public-sector jobs)
are only possible with political power; we recognize, of course, that the ability to engage
in patronage depends upon both power and wealth in most political settings.
Chickens retire after five rounds. Chickens in our game have finite lifespans. Hence, a
subject must continually win elections in order to hold onto power. A further implication
is that, from round 6 onwards, there are always five living chickens, since each chicken
“birth” is offset by a retirement. A subject’s power can be measured, from round 6 on-
wards, by the number of chickens they own out of five.
Fixed number of chickens and eggs. The game is zero-sum, with a fixed surplus of 270
eggs. As such, we will be principally interested in the division of this surplus. There
is also a fixed amount of power allocated over the course of the game. We will also be
interested in the distribution of this power.
Deciding voter. We chose to have a deciding voter — who receives the entirety of the
election winner’s pledge — because it reduces strategic complexity. For instance, if the
election winner’s pledge were divided between the winner’s supporters, voters would
need to take into account the likely split of the pledge. If, additionally, there were plurality
voting, voters would need to factor in each candidate’s chances of winning.
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4 Results of the Baseline Treatment
We will start by relating the findings of our baseline treatment, where candidates can
pledge eggs to voters.
Emergence of Lords
Our first finding is that power tends to concentrate in the hands of a single person. From
round 6 onwards, we refer to subjects as “lords” when they own at least four out of five
living chickens. 87.2 percent of groups have a lord in at least one round. Across all groups,
40 percent of rounds have a lord.10
Furthermore, power is relatively stable. Figure 1 shows how long lords tend to stay
in power. Following Clark and Summers (1979), the distribution shown in Figure 1 is
weighted by tenure length. While there are some short tenures, 53 percent of tenures are
9 rounds or more. The average lord tenure is 10.1 rounds.11
Figure 1: Distribution of Lord Tenures12
10Figure A.1 shows that the prevalence of lords is more-or-less constant over the course of the game. There
are two time trends of note in Figure A.1, though. First, candidates pledge slightly less in the final four
rounds — most likely because the chickens-to-be-won are less productive (they lay eggs for less than five
rounds). Second, there is a decline over time in the number of candidates.
11To understand why we weight by tenure length, consider the following example adapted from Clark and
Summers (1979). Suppose there are 20 lords with tenures of one round and one lord with a tenure of 20
rounds. The mean lord tenure is only 1.9 rounds; however, half of all rounds with a lord are accounted for
by a 20-round tenure. Hence, focusing on mean tenure underweights long tenures. Clark and Summers
(1979) argue that a solution is to look at the distribution of tenures one would expect to observe in a given
round. Weighting by tenure length accomplishes this.
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Why do lords emerge? We find that there is a “power begets power” dynamic in the
game: that is, having power (i.e., chickens) makes it easier to win elections and acquire
more power. We believe that this dynamic accounts for the emergence of lords.
Figure 2 provides some suggestive evidence of such a dynamic. It shows that having
chickens is positively correlated with winning elections.
Figure 2: Power and Win Rates13
We can exploit randomness in election outcomes to formally test whether such a dy-
namic exists. In some elections, several candidates receive the same number of votes; and
one wins rather than the others purely due to chance. We find that winners of such “bal-
anced” elections have a 12.4 percent higher win rate in subsequent rounds of the game
than equally-popular losers (see Table 1).
Alternatively, we can use the first election to test for a “power begets power” dynamic.
In the first round, all candidates look the same given that there is no prior history of play
and no candidate has eggs to pledge. Consequently, it is (essentially) random which sub-
ject, among those who run, wins the first election. We find that first-round winners have a
16.6 percent higher win rate in subsequent rounds of the game than first-round losers (see
Table 1). The only potential concern is that subjects may systematically vote for certain
pseudonyms over others; but the results remain similar after including pseudonym fixed
12A tenure is defined as a continuous spell as a lord. Some subjects have multiple spells as a lord and
therefore appear more than once.
13Figure 2 restricts attention to Rounds 6 - 29. Observations are at the candidate-round level. Standard
errors are clustered at the group level. As further evidence of a relationship, in an OLS regression of
whether one won on number of chickens owned, the coefficient on number of chickens owned is positive
and significant (p=0.000).
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Table 1: Tests of the “Power begets Power” Dynamic
Dep var: Future win rate Balanced First First
Election Election Election
Won 0.124*** 0.166*** 0.164***
(0.023) (0.040) (0.042)
Three-way tie -0.026
(0.018)
Constant 0.204*** 0.134*** 0.154***
(0.015) (0.009) (0.033)
Pseudonym fixed effects X
Observations 617 231 231
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01, OLS with candidate-level observations. Standard errors
are clustered at the group level. An election is balanced if two or three candi-
dates tie for first in votes obtained. “Three-way tie” is a dummy for whether, in
a balanced election, three candidates tied for first.
effects.
As one might expect given the game’s “power begets power” dynamic, it is incredibly
valuable to win the first election. First-round winners earn 35.7 more eggs than first-
round losers on average; and first-round winners have a 55.6 percent chance of becoming
lords, compared to 16.4 percent for first-round losers.14
Why does power beget power? Patronage is critical to the emergence of a “power begets
power” dynamic. Indeed, we find that the dynamic vanishes completely in the no-pledge
treatment (see Section 5). This result is intuitive. A chicken gives a subject eggs to pledge;
and pledging eggs (presumably) helps a subject win further chickens. Indeed, in con-
tested elections, we observe a positive correlation between winning and the amount
pledged (see Table 2, Column 1). We also find that lords who pledge a larger share of
their eggs have longer tenures (see Table 2, Column 2).
Emergence of Vassals
When a lord is present, other subjects tend to behave like “vassals”: they vote for the
lord rather than run or vote against the lord the majority of the time. On average, when
14The differences in earnings and in chance of becoming a lord are significant under a Wald test (p=0.000).
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Table 2: Pledging Behavior and Electoral Success
Won Election Tenure as a Lord
Amount pledged 0.621***
(0.043)
Proportion pledged during tenure 8.615**
(3.419)
Observations 3724 104
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Column 1: conditional logit regression with candidate-round
level observations (Rounds 6 - 29). Column 2: OLS regression with candidate-tenure
level observations; for candidates with multiple contiguous tenures as lord, each tenure
period is a separate observation. For both columns, standard errors are clustered at
group level.
a lord runs for election, 50.3 percent of other subjects vote for the lord, compared to 13.9
percent who vote for another candidate and 35.9 percent who challenge the lord. Vassal-
like behavior makes it easier for lords to retain power, and thus reinforces the “power
begets power” dynamic.
More generally, electoral competition is weaker when power is more concentrated.
Figure 3 shows that there are fewer candidates, on average, when the most powerful
group member has more chickens.
Figure 3: Power Concentration and Run Rates15
Why do lords face few challengers? There is a strong economic case to be made for be-
having like a “vassal.” First, challengers rarely beat lords. In rounds where a lord is
15Figure 3 restricts attention to Rounds 6 - 29. Observations are at the group-round level. Standard errors are
clustered at the group level. As further evidence of a relationship, in a group-round level OLS regression
of number of candidates on chickens of the most powerful group member, the coefficient on chickens of
the most powerful group member is negative and significant (p=0.000).
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challenged, the lord wins 72.3 percent of the time. Second, lords give substantial hand-
outs to subjects who vote for them: subjects who vote for a lord receive 1.04 eggs, on
average. Subjects forgo the opportunity to partake of these handouts when they chal-
lenge a lord. Our post-experiment survey suggests that these economic considerations
were at the forefront of subjects’ minds (see Table A.1).
Fragility of Lords
Since “power begets power,” one might expect lords to hold onto power indefinitely.
However, we find that power is not perfectly stable. While Figure 1 shows that some lord
tenures are long, it also shows that many are short. 24.9 percent of tenures are 4 rounds
or less. Furthermore, power often changes hands. The first lord to emerge is toppled and
replaced by another lord in 52 percent of groups where at least one lord emerges.
Why is power fragile? One possibility is that lords lose power because they do not
pledge enough — or do not run for election. We find that this is at most a small part of
the story, however. Lords choose not to run only 4.4 percent of the time; and lords are
out-pledged when they run only 0.8 percent of the time. In 84.1 percent of rounds where
a lord’s tenure ends, the lord runs for election and makes the (strictly) largest pledge. In
these rounds, voters oppose the lord even though they lose eggs in that round by doing
so.
Lords largely lose power, we think, because voters favor “underdog” candidates. We
find, for instance, that owning chickens hurts — rather than helps — candidates after
controlling for pledge size (see Table 3, Column 2). Subjects also indicated in our post-
experiment survey that they were inclined to vote for underdogs. There appear to have
been two reasons for this preference (see Table A.1).
One reason was concern about equity. In our survey, subjects indicated that they some-
times voted against the candidate with the most chickens because they saw it as fair. Fur-
thermore, subjects saw winning chickens as largely a matter of luck, which may have
particularly inclined them to vote against lords.16
16The average response was 6.6 out of 10 to the question: “To what extent do you think winning chickens
was a matter of luck?” (see Table A.1). Consistent with our findings, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) have
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Table 3: Determinants of Candidate Vote Share
Dep var: voted for candidate Column 1 Column 2
Candidate’s Number of Chickens 0.425*** -0.096***
(0.024) (0.036)
Candidate’s Pledge 0.507***
(0.043)
Candidate Made Largest Pledge 0.482***
(0.094)
Observations 9464 9464
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Both columns: conditional logits (Rounds 6 - 29), with
candidate-voter-round level observations. Standard errors are clustered at
the group level.
Subjects also had an economic rationale for supporting underdogs. In our survey,
they indicated that they voted against the candidate with the most chickens because they
thought competition would increase the size of pledges. We do, in fact, find that candi-
dates pledged more when competition was greater. Figure 4 looks at rounds where there
is a single challenger to the leader. It shows that the largest pledge is strictly increasing in
the challenger’s size.
Figure 4: Competition and Pledge Sizes17
shown that people are willing to act against their economic interest for the sake of equity; and Alesina
and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006) find that people are particularly concerned with
equity when they see outcomes as due to luck.
17Figure 4 restricts attention to Rounds 6 - 29 and to cases where the top 2 candidates own all five chickens.
Observations are at the group-round level. Standard errors are clustered at the group level. As further
evidence of a relationship, in an OLS regression of highest pledge on challenger’s size, the coefficient on
challenger’s size is positive and significant (p=0.000).
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Figure 5: Wealth and Power Inequality18
Wealth Distribution
Considerable inequality — in power and wealth — emerge in our experiment. We mea-
sure a subject’s power (wealth) by the total number of chickens won (eggs accumulated)
over the course of the experiment. Figure 5 shows that, on average, the most powerful
subject acquires 49.5 percent of total power — compared to 2.1 percent for the least pow-
erful subject. The wealthiest subject acquires 35.5 percent of total wealth, compared to
6.2 percent for the least wealthy subject. The figure shows that, while wealth inequality
is substantial, it is less pronounced than power inequality. Overall wealth inequality —
as measured by the average group Gini coefficient — is 0.32, compared to 0.51 for power
(this difference is significant in a paired t-test, p=0.000).
Wealth inequality is less pronounced because the powerful transfer some of their eggs
to the less powerful. For instance, lords give away 28.4 percent of their eggs on average.
Figure 6 shows that, within groups, less-wealthy subjects obtain most of their eggs from
transfers; in contrast, wealthy subjects obtain most of their eggs from their own chickens.
In the average group, transfers make up 41.3 percent of total earnings.
Why do people give away eggs? Subjects may give away eggs because they consider it
fair. Alternatively, they may give away eggs to acquire or retain power. Power may be its
18In Figure 5, observations are at the subject level, and standard errors are clustered at the group level. Ties
in rank are broken at random.
19In Figure 6, observations are at the subject level, and standard errors are clustered at the group level. Ties
in rank are broken at random. As further evidence of a relationship, in a OLS regression of fraction of
wealth from chickens on wealth rank, the coefficient on wealth rank is negative and significant (p=0.000).
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Figure 6: Sources of Wealth, by Subject Rank19
own reward; it may also, ultimately, lead to a higher egg payoff.
Figure 7 shows that subjects pledge a larger fraction of their eggs when they have
fewer chickens. If subjects were concerned solely with fairness, it seems natural that they
would pledge a smaller fraction of their eggs when they have fewer chickens. Hence,
Figure 7 provides suggestive evidence that subjects give away eggs, at least in part, be-
cause they value power. Likewise, our survey indicates that, while fairness was a concern,
pledging was more driven by subjects’ desire to win elections (see Table A.1).
Figure 7: Power and Pledging Behavior20
20The data in Figure 7 is from Rounds 6 - 29. Observations are at the candidate-round level. Standard errors
are clustered at the group level. As further evidence of a relationship, in an OLS regression of proportion
pledged on chickens owned, with standard errors clustered at the group level, the coefficient on chickens
owned is negative and significant (p=0.000). The coefficient on chickens owned remains negative and
significant (p=0.000) when we include individual fixed effects.
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Figure 8: Wealth Inequality Across Groups
Differences Across Groups
Some groups are substantially more unequal than others (see Figure 8). Suppose we rank
groups by their wealth Gini coefficients. In the top quintile of groups, the average Gini
coefficient is 0.47 and the wealthiest subject acquires 52.6 percent of total wealth (on aver-
age). In the bottom quintile, inequality is much lower: the average Gini coefficient is 0.15
and the wealthiest subject only acquires 22.6 percent of total wealth (on average).21
Groups in the bottom quintile achieve equal outcomes by distributing power equally
rather than by transferring wealth. Figure 9 shows that wealth inequality and power
inequality are highly correlated; it also shows that transfers are not particularly large in
low-inequality groups (transfers are actually lower than in high-inequality groups).
Why do groups differ? We suspect group differences are driven by different norms re-
garding what is fair. In line with this view, we find that voters show a greater preference
for underdogs in low-inequality groups (see Table 4). We also find, in our post-experiment
survey, that subjects in low-inequality groups are more concerned with fairness and less
concerned with winning eggs (see Table A.4).
21The wealth Ginis of the top and bottom quintiles are significantly different in a two-sided t-test (p=0.000),
as are the power Ginis (p=0.000).
22Figures 9a and 9b depict group-level OLS regressions of (a) power Gini on wealth Gini and (b) transfers
on wealth Gini. The wealth Gini coefficients for both regressions are positive and significant: (a) p=0.000,
R2=0.766; (b) p=0.008, R2=0.124.
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(a) Wealth Inequality and Power Inequality (b) Wealth Inequality and Transfers
Figure 9: Correlates of Wealth Inequality22
Table 4: Determinants of Candidate Vote Share
Voted for candidate
Candidate’s Pledge 0.590***
(0.045)
Candidate Made Largest Pledge 0.538***
(0.095)
Candidate’s Number of Chickens -0.720***
(0.097)
Candidate’s Number of Chickens × Group’s Wealth Gini 1.540***
(0.242)
Observations 9464
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Conditional logits (Rounds 6 - 29) with candidate-voter-round level
observations. Standard errors clustered at group level.
5 The Role of Pledges
We turn now to the results of the no-pledge treatment. Our theory is that patronage
gives rise to a “power begets power” dynamic in the baseline treatment, which in turn
generates inequality. The no-pledge treatment allows us to test this hypothesis. In the
no-pledge treatment, we eliminate patronage by knocking out the ability to pledge eggs.
If our hypothesis is correct, we should see less inequality in the no-pledge treatment;
furthermore, the “power begets power” dynamic should disappear. This is indeed what
17
Figure 10: Wealth and Power Inequality, by Treatment23
we find.
Inequality is dramatically lower in the no-pledge treatment (see Figure 10). The aver-
age wealth Gini is 0.08 (versus 0.32 in the baseline) and the wealthiest group member cap-
tures just 20.5 percent of the total surplus on average (versus 35.5 percent in the baseline).
The average power Gini is 0.08 (versus 0.51 in the baseline) and the most powerful group
member captures just 20.2 percent of total power (versus 49.5 percent in the baseline).
Furthermore, in the no-pledge treatment, we never see a lord, compared to 40 percent of
rounds (87.2 percent of groups) in the baseline treatment.24
The “power begets power” dynamic is also absent in the no-pledge treatment. In fact,
we find that winning an election hurts rather than helps in subsequent rounds — perhaps
due to subjects’ concern about equity. The winners of “balanced” elections win 7 percent
less often in subsequent rounds of the game than equally-popular losers (see Table 5).
Similarly, the first-round winner wins 1.3 percent less often in subsequent rounds of the
game than first-round losers.
23Observations are at the subject level. Standard errors are clustered at the group level.
24These differences are all significant (p=0.000) under two-sided t-tests.
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Table 5: Tests of the “Power begets Power” Dynamic in the No-Pledge Treatment
Dep var: Future win rate Balanced First First
Election Election Election
Won -0.070*** -0.013 -0.012
(0.014) (0.009) (0.009)
Three-way tie -0.022
(0.013)
Constant 0.209*** 0.168*** 0.165***
(0.009) (0.002) (0.007)
Pseudonym fixed effects X
Observations 317 95 95
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01, OLS with candidate-level observations. Standard errors
are clustered at the group level. An election is balanced if two or three candi-
dates tie for first in votes obtained. “Three-way tie” is a dummy for whether,
in a balanced election, exactly three candidates tied for first.
Comparing Inequality Against a Benchmark
It is almost inevitable that some inequality will arise in the game simply due to chance.
To assess whether subjects’ behavior results in additional inequality — beyond this back-
ground level — it is useful to compare our two treatments against a benchmark. Con-
sider a benchmark where subjects are completely passive: they always run for election
(or, equivalently, never run for election). The outcome in this case is that, each round, the
chicken is randomly allocated and no transfers take place.
Figure 11: Wealth Gini Distributions by Treatment
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Table 6: Candidate Vote Shares vs. Candidate Power, by Treatment
Dep var: Voted for Candidate No Pledge Baseline
Candidate’s No. of Chickens -1.598*** 0.425***
(0.224) (0.024)
Observations 3690 9464
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Conditional logits with candidate-voter-round level ob-
servations (Rounds 6 - 29). Standard errors clustered at group level.
Figure 11 compares wealth inequality in the two treatments against this passive bench-
mark. We obtained a distribution of outcomes for the benchmark by simulating play for
10,000 groups. It is not surprising, given the “power begets power” dynamic, that in-
equality in the baseline treatment (average Gini of 0.32) is higher than the benchmark (av-
erage Gini of 0.22). Interestingly, inequality in the no-pledge treatment is lower than the
benchmark (0.08 versus 0.22); in other words, subjects actually reduce inequality rather
than contribute to it.
One way in which subjects reduce inequality in the no-pledge treatment is through
their voting behavior. In the no-pledge treatment, candidates with more chickens receive
fewer votes — in contrast to the baseline treatment where they receive more (see Table 6).
Presumably, absent pledging, voters are freer to express an underdog preference. Subjects
also reduce inequality in the no-pledge treatment by taking turns at winning. Figure 12a
shows that election winners rarely run in the next round: they run 21.2 percent of the
time, compared to 61.5 percent for election losers. By contrast, in the baseline treatment,
election winners run in the next round 75.5 percent of the time, compared to 45.1 percent
for election losers.
We speculate that the taking-of-turns reflects, at least in part, a relational contract that
restrains subjects from running too frequently. Such a relational contract may be eas-
ier to enforce in the no-pledge treatment than the baseline, where patronage can create
temptations to renege. Figure 12b shows that run rates increase in the no-pledge treat-
ment towards the end of the game, which we interpret as a breakdown of the relational
contract in the final rounds.
25The data in Figure 12 is from rounds 1 to 29. In Figure 12a, observations are at the candidate-round level
and standard errors are clustered at the group level.
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(a) Winners vs. Losers (b) By Round
Figure 12: Run Rates25
6 Gender Differences
There are large gender differences in outcomes in our baseline treatment (see Table 7).
On average, women have only 84.7 percent of the wealth of men and only 70.4 percent of
the power. The differences are particularly striking in the tail of the distribution. Women
are only 56.3 percent as likely as men to end the game as the wealthiest group member;
they are only 45.6 percent as likely as men to ever become lords; and they are lords only
31.9 percent as often. In the no-pledge treatment, by contrast, there are no significant
differences between the genders.
What accounts for differences in the baseline treatment? The differences in outcomes must
be due to gender differences in style of play — rather than discrimination. Subjects cannot
be discriminated against for their gender since they are only identified by gender-neutral
pseudonyms — such as “Mushroom” and “Spinach.”
While there are gender differences in style of play, they are small — and they seem
to belie the dramatic gender disparities in outcomes. The most notable style-of-play dif-
ference is that women run for election less often than men: 12.5 percent less often in the
first round and 5.5 percent less often overall (see Table 8). This is probably not the only
style-of-play difference, though, since women win less often when they run for election,
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Table 7: Gender Differences in Outcomes
Baseline No Pledge
Female Male Difference Female Male Difference
mean (sd) mean (sd) b (p-value) mean (sd) mean (sd) b (p-value)
Wealth 41.467 48.971 -7.505*** 44.333 45.549 -1.216
(24.554) (34.858) (0.007) (8.358) (7.710) (0.496)
Power 4.007 5.690 -1.683*** 4.704 4.930 -0.226
(4.160) (6.377) (0.002) (0.944) (0.799) (0.246)
Was ever a Lord 0.147 0.322 -0.175*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.355) (0.469) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (.)
Rounds as a Lord 0.793 2.483 -1.689*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(2.400) (5.085) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (.)
Was Wealthiest 0.120 0.213 -0.093** 0.167 0.169 -0.002
Group Member (0.326) (0.410) (0.020) (0.376) (0.377) (0.974)
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Tests of differences use standard errors clustered at group
level.
controlling for number of chickens owned (see Table 9). For example, women with three
chickens — who are on the cusp of becoming lords — have a win rate of only 42.8 per-
cent, compared to 59.9 percent for men. Women in our sample pledge less than men (see
Table 8), which we suspect is one reason for their lower win rates. Women with three
chickens, for instance, pledge 54 percent of their eggs on average, compared to 61 percent
for men.26
Given the small size of the style-of-play differences, it is difficult to reach firm conclu-
sions about what drives them. Nor does our survey offer any helpful clues: the responses
of men and women are very similar.27 It is possible that women are less proactive than
men about seizing power — just as other work has shown that women are less likely than
men to seek out job promotions. For instance, in a laboratory experiment, Small et al.
(2007) find that men are nine times more likely than women to ask for higher compensa-
tion (see also Babcock and Laschever, 2003; Dittrich et al., 2014; Leibbrandt and List, 2014;
Card et al., 2015; Exley et al., forthcoming). Women have also been shown to shy away
from competition (see Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011 for a review). For instance, Niederle
and Vesterlund (2007) find that women — of equal ability to men — are less than half as
26We do not observe any significant differences in how men and women vote. Both genders vote similarly
in response to candidates’ pledges, and earn similar amounts per round (see Tables A.2 and A.3). Conse-
quently, gender differences in wealth and power do not seem to be driven by gender differences in voting
behavior.
27None of the survey responses exhibit gender differences at a 10-percent significance level under standard
t-tests.
22
Table 8: Gender Differences in Style-of-Play
Female Male Difference
mean (sd) mean (sd) b (p-value)
Run Rates
Round 1 0.633 0.759 -0.125**
(0.484) (0.429) (0.015)
Overall 0.492 0.547 -0.055**
(0.199) (0.231) (0.035)
Proportion pledged conditional on running and†
1 Chicken 0.854 0.905 -0.051*
(0.240) (0.189) (0.058)
2 Chickens 0.774 0.839 -0.065*
(0.201) (0.188) (0.053)
3 Chickens 0.540 0.610 -0.070**
(0.173) (0.239) (0.046)
4 Chickens 0.342 0.409 -0.067*
(0.124) (0.171) (0.061)
5 Chickens 0.306 0.287 0.019
(0.128) (0.157) (0.68)
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Tests of differences use standard errors clustered at group level.
†Data is from Rounds 6 - 29. Observations are at the subject level; variables are averaged for
each subject.
Table 9: Gender Differences in Win-Rates
Female Male Difference
mean (sd) mean (sd) b (p-value)
Win rates conditional on running and
0 Chickens 0.158 0.193 -0.035
(0.224) (0.266) (0.299)
1 Chicken 0.319 0.304 0.014
(0.320) (0.318) (0.770)
2 Chickens 0.410 0.522 -0.112**
(0.351) (0.340) (0.037)
3 Chickens 0.428 0.599 -0.170**
(0.382) (0.363) (0.035)
4 Chickens 0.460 0.661 -0.201**
(0.398) (0.280) (0.044)
5 Chickens 0.650 0.719 -0.069
(0.275) (0.268) (0.454)
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Tests of differences use standard errors clustered at group level.
Data is from Rounds 6 - 29. Observations are at the subject level; variables are averaged for
each subject.
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likely to enter a tournament. One could interpret our findings in these terms. However,
women do compete in our experiment: they run for election only slightly less often (14.3
times, on average, versus 15.9 times for men).
We believe that the game’s “power begets power” dynamic explains why small style-
of-play differences translate into large disparities in outcomes. For instance, because of
the game’s “power begets power” dynamic, it is quite important to run in the first round.
We estimate that gender differences in run rates in the first round alone — while small —
account for 11.1 percent of the total gender wealth gap.28
7 Conclusion
This paper uses a new game — the “chicken-and-egg game” — to study the political
process. Our main finding is that patronage, through a “power begets power” dynamic,
generates considerable inequality between individuals and between genders.
The chicken-and-egg game can easily be adapted to explore issues beyond those fo-
cused on in this paper. For instance, one potential direction for future work could be
to study non-zero-sum political conflicts where politicians destroy surplus in pursuit
of power. Take, for instance, pork-barrel politics resulting in “bridges to nowhere,” or
destructive wars between feudal lords. Within the chicken-and-egg game, “bridges to
nowhere” could be modeled as inefficient transfers from candidates to voters; wars could
be introduced as a technology that gives candidates the ability to destroy others’ chickens.
Given that political institutions are a key driver of development and a major deter-
minant of the distribution of resources, it is critical to understand how they evolve and
change. We believe that the time is ripe to study political evolution in the laboratory and
we see the chicken-and-egg game as a promising vehicle for doing so.
28If women increased their run rates in the first round by 12.5 percent — to the level of men — we would
expect them to earn an additional 0.125× 29.1× 0.230 = 0.837 eggs since: (i) women who win, rather than
lose, the first election earn an additional 29.1 eggs, and (ii) women have a 23.0 percent chance of winning
when they run. The overall gender wealth gap is 7.51 eggs, so 0.837 eggs constitutes 11.1 percent.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Survey Results (Baseline)
Mean Response
(SD)
Pledging strategies ranked by importance
(1) I pledged eggs because I wanted to win elections. 7.409
(2.989)
(2) I pledged eggs because I was concerned with fairness. 4.424
(3.440)
Voting strategies ranked by importance
(1) I voted for the candidate who pledged the most eggs. 6.432
(2.873)
(2) I voted against the candidate with the most chickens because I thought 5.652
more competition would increase pledges to voters. (3.327)
(3) I voted against the candidate with the most chickens because it was the 4.924
fair thing to do. (3.211)
(4) I voted for candidates who pledged a large share of their eggs, even if 4.811
they did not pledge the most. (3.252)
(5) I voted for candidates who voted for me in the past. 4.436
(3.600)
(6) I was easily bored so I voted more or less randomly. 2.443
(2.976)
Running strategies ranked by importance
(1) I chose whether to be a candidate or voter depending on what I thought 6.833
would get me the most eggs. (2.791)
(2) I sometimes chose to vote because I wanted to support/oppose a particular 5.523
candidate, even when I thought it would not get me the most eggs. (3.514)
(3) I sometimes chose to be a candidate because I wanted to oppose someone I 4.674
wanted to see lose, even when I thought it would not get me the most eggs. (3.519)
(4) I sometimes chose to vote because I felt it was unfair to be a candidate too 4.580
often or win too many chickens. (3.719)
(5) I was easily bored so I chose whether to be a voter or a candidate more or 2.466
less randomly. (2.965)
Luck?
To what extent do you think winning chickens was a matter of luck? 6.614
(2.826)
Responses are on a likert scale from 0 to 10.
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Table A.2: Gender Differences in Amounts Received as a Voter (Baseline)
Amount Received
Male 0.019
(0.070)
Constant 0.889***
(0.044)
Observations 3817
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. OLS with voter-round level observations
(Rounds 6 - 29). Standard errors clustered at group level.
Table A.3: Gender Differences in Voting Behavior (Baseline)
Voted for Candidate
Candidate’s Number of Chickens -0.106***
(0.039)
Candidate’s Pledge 0.507***
(0.061)
Candidate Made Largest Pledge 0.549***
(0.145)
Candidate’s Number of Chickens ×Male Voter 0.013
(0.064)
Candidate’s Pledge ×Male Voter 0.008
(0.081)
Candidate Made Largest Pledge ×Male Voter -0.178
(0.199)
Observations 9284
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Conditional logits with candidate-voter-round level observations
(Rounds 6 - 29). Standard errors clustered at group level.
Table A.4: Group’s Survey Responses and Inequality (Baseline)
Wealth Gini
Group voted based on winning eggs 0.032***
(0.011)
Group voted based on fairness -0.026**
(0.011)
Constant 0.234**
(0.091)
Observations 44
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01, Group level OLS.
30
Table A.5: Survey Results (No-Pledge)
Mean Response
(SD)
Voting strategies ranked by importance
(1) I voted against the candidate with the most chickens because it was the 6.976
fair thing to do. (3.525)
(2) I voted for candidates who voted for me in the past. 6.720
(3.340)
(3) I was easily bored so I voted more or less randomly. 1.632
(2.441)
Running strategies ranked by importance
(1) I sometimes chose to vote because I wanted to support/oppose a particular 6.432
candidate. (3.342)
(2) I chose whether to be a candidate or voter depending on what I thought 6.256
would get me the most eggs. (3.255)
(3) I sometimes chose to vote because I felt it was unfair to be a candidate too 6.064
often or win too many chickens. (3.512)
(4) I sometimes chose to be a candidate because I wanted to oppose someone I 3.504
wanted to see lose (3.585)
(5) I was easily bored so I chose whether to be a voter or a candidate more or 1.336
less randomly. (2.016)
Luck?
To what extent do you think winning chickens was a matter of luck? 5.256
(2.932)
Responses are on a likert scale from 0 to 10.
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Figure A.1: Time Trends (Baseline)
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Instructions 
 
Ground Rules 
 
Welcome to the experiment. Please read the instructions below carefully.  
 
Communication between participants is not allowed. Also, please refrain from using any 
communication devices. If you have any questions at any time, please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come over to see you.  
 
If you need to write anything, please use the paper and pen provided. Please do not write 
anything on this instruction sheet. 
 
 
Groups and Privacy 
 
The computer will randomly assign you to a group of six participants.  You will interact only 
with the participants in your group. The computer will randomly select an ID for you, such as 
“Cabbage” or “Potato.” You will keep the same ID throughout the experiment. 
 
Your decisions in the experiment will be anonymous, and your anonymity will be strictly 
preserved. Participants will interact with each other using only their IDs. For example, you may 
learn that “Cabbage has voted for you”; but you will not be told the real name of “Cabbage.”  
 
 
Chickens and Eggs 
 
In this experiment, you may win chickens that lay eggs for you. You may give some of your eggs 
to other participants. At the end of the experiment, your eggs will be converted into dollars at 
the rate of 5 eggs to $1. 
 
 
Rounds 
 
The experiment will consist of 30 rounds. 
 
In each round, except the final round, an election will take place. The winner of the election 
receives a chicken. Chickens lay eggs for five rounds, and then retire.   
 
 
Your Coop and Your Basket 
 
Your chickens live in your chicken coop. At the start of each round, each of your chickens lays 
two eggs in the coop. You may give some of these eggs to other participants. 
 
At the end of the round, the eggs in your coop are transferred to your egg basket. 
 
B Supplementary materials
B.1 Instructions (Baseline)
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Details of Elections 
 
In each round except the final round, there is an election to determine who will win a chicken. 
You will have a choice whether to 1) be a candidate in the election or 2) a voter in the election.  
One voter will be selected at random by the computer to be the deciding voter.  The election 
outcome will be determined by the deciding voter’s vote.   
 
The election will proceed as follows: 
 
Step 1:   If you are a candidate, you may pledge to give some eggs from your coop to the 
deciding voter if he/she votes for you. 
 
Step 2:   If you are a voter, you will choose whom to vote for after observing the candidate’s 
pledges.  The computer will then randomly select the deciding voter. 
 
Step 3:   At the end of the election, the election winner’s pledge will be transferred to the 
deciding voter’s basket. 
 
If nobody chooses to be a candidate or nobody chooses to be a voter, the computer randomly 
allocates the chicken to one participant.  
 
 
Final Round 
 
In the final round, there is no election.  Each chicken’s eggs are immediately placed in its 
owner’s basket. 
 
 
Payment 
 
At the end of the experiment, the eggs in your basket will be converted into dollars at the rate 
of 5 eggs to $1.  You will also receive a show-up fee of $5.  You will be paid privately and 
confidentially. 
 
You will be asked to fill in a short questionnaire before being paid. 
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B.2 Screenshots (Baseline)
Start Screen
Screen 1
35
Screen 2 (Voter)
Screen 2 (Candidate)
36
Screen 3 (Voter)
Screen 3 (Candidate)
37
Screen 4
Screen 5
38
End Screen 1
End Screen 2
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Instructions 
 
Ground Rules 
 
Welcome to the experiment. Please read the instructions below carefully.  
 
Communication between participants is not allowed. Also, please refrain from using any 
communication devices. If you have any questions at any time, please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come over to see you.  
 
If you need to write anything, please use the paper and pen provided. Please do not write 
anything on this instruction sheet. 
 
 
Groups and Privacy 
 
The computer will randomly assign you to a group of six participants.  You will interact only 
with the participants in your group. The computer will randomly select an ID for you, such as 
“Cabbage” or “Potato.” You will keep the same ID throughout the experiment. 
 
Your decisions in the experiment will be anonymous, and your anonymity will be strictly 
preserved. Participants will interact with each other using only their IDs. For example, you may 
learn that “Cabbage has voted for you”; but you will not be told the real name of “Cabbage.”  
 
 
Chickens and Eggs 
 
In this experiment, you may win chickens that lay eggs for you. At the end of the experiment, 
your eggs will be converted into dollars at the rate of 5 eggs to $1. 
 
 
Rounds 
 
The experiment will consist of 30 rounds. 
 
In each round, except the final round, an election will take place. The winner of the election 
receives a chicken. Chickens lay eggs for five rounds, and then retire.   
 
 
Your Coop and Your Basket 
 
Your chickens live in your chicken coop. 
 
At the start of each round, each of your chickens lays two eggs.  These eggs are put in your 
basket. 
 
 
B.3 Instructions (No Pledge)
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Details of Elections 
 
In each round except the final round, there is an election to determine who will win a chicken. 
You will have a choice whether to 1) be a candidate in the election or 2) a voter in the election.   
 
If you choose to be a voter, you will cast a vote for one of the candidates.  The computer will 
then randomly select a deciding voter.  The election outcome will be determined by the 
deciding voter’s vote.   
 
If nobody chooses to be a candidate or nobody chooses to be a voter, the computer randomly 
allocates the chicken to one participant.  
 
 
Final Round 
 
In the final round, there is no election.  You will simply receive the eggs laid by your chickens. 
 
 
Payment 
 
At the end of the experiment, the eggs in your basket will be converted into dollars at the rate 
of 5 eggs to $1.  You will also receive a show-up fee of $5.  You will be paid privately and 
confidentially. 
 
You will be asked to fill in a short questionnaire before being paid. 
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B.4 Screenshots (No Pledge)
Start Screen
Screen 1
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Screen 2 (Voter)
Screen 2 (Candidate)
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Screen 3
Screen 4
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B.5 Post-Experiment Survey
Demographic questions
What is your age? (If you would prefer not to answer, please leave it blank.)
What is your year of study? [1st Year, 2nd Year, 3rd Year, 4th Year, Postgraduate]
What is your nationality?
What is your course of study?
What is your gender? [Male, Female, I’d prefer not to answer, Other (Please describe if you wish)]
Voting behaviour*
How well do the following statements describe the strategies you followed as a voter? Note if you
never voted, please indicate how you think you would have voted. [0: Not well at all - 10: Extremely
well]
(B) I voted for the candidate who pledged the most eggs.
(B) I voted for candidates who pledged a large share of their eggs, even if they did not pledge the
most.
(B) I voted against the candidate with the most chickens because I thought more competition
would increase pledges to voters.
I voted against the candidate with the most chickens because it was the fair thing to do.
I voted for candidates who voted for me in the past.
I was easily bored so I voted more or less randomly.
Are there other strategies you followed? If so, please describe below.
Pledging behaviour*
How well do the following statements describe your reasons for pledging eggs when you were a
candidate? Note: if you were never a candidate, please indicate how you think you would have pledged.
[0: Not well at all - 10: Extremely well]
(B) I pledged eggs because I was concerned with fairness.
(B) I pledged eggs because I wanted to win elections.
(B) Are there other reasons you pledged eggs? If so, please describe below.
Running behaviour*
How well do the following statements describe your reasons for choosing whether to be a candi-
date or a voter in each round? [0: Not well at all - 10: Extremely well]
I chose whether to be a candidate or voter depending on what I thought would get me the most
eggs.
I sometimes chose to vote because I felt it was unfair to be a candidate too often or win too many
chickens.
(NP) I sometimes chose to vote because I wanted to support/oppose a particular candidate.
(B) I sometimes chose to vote because I wanted to support/oppose a particular candidate, even
when I thought it would not get me the most eggs.
(NP) I sometimes chose to be a candidate because I wanted to oppose someone I wanted to see
lose.
(B) I sometimes chose to be a candidate because I wanted to oppose someone I wanted to see lose,
even when I thought it would not get me the most eggs.
I was easily bored so I chose whether to be a voter or a candidate more or less randomly.
Are there other reasons why you chose to be a candidate or voter? If so, please describe below.
(B): only for baseline treatment. (NP): only for No Pledge treatment.
*Order of questions within section was randomised.
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Miscellaneous questions
To what extent do you think winning chickens was a matter of luck? [0: Not Luck - 10: Mostly
Luck ]
How much do you value having authority over other people? [0: Not at all - 10: A lot ]
Was there anything unclear about the instructions?
Disadvantageous inequity aversion
In each row below, you will have to choose between hypothetical allocations of experimental
Coins between yourself and another. Please select for each row, which option you prefer.
(1) Option A: You: 12.5 Coins, Other: 15 Coins Option B: You: 10 Coins, Other: 26 Coins
(2) Option A: You: 11.5 Coins, Other: 15 Coins Option B: You: 10 Coins, Other: 26 Coins
(3) Option A: You: 10.5 Coins, Other: 15 Coins Option B: You: 10 Coins, Other: 26 Coins
(4) Option A: You: 9.5 Coins, Other: 15 Coins Option B: You: 10 Coins, Other: 26 Coins
(5) Option A: You: 8.5 Coins, Other: 15 Coins Option B: You: 10 Coins, Other: 26 Coins
(6) Option A: You: 7.5 Coins, Other: 15 Coins Option B: You: 10 Coins, Other: 26 Coins
(7) Option A: You: 6.5 Coins, Other: 15 Coins Option B: You: 10 Coins, Other: 26 Coins
(8) Option A: You: 5.5 Coins, Other: 15 Coins Option B: You: 10 Coins, Other: 26 Coins
(9) Option A: You: 4.5 Coins, Other: 15 Coins Option B: You: 10 Coins, Other: 26 Coins
(10) Option A: You: 3.5 Coins, Other: 15 Coins Option B: You: 10 Coins, Other: 26 Coins
Advantageous inequity aversion
In each row below, you will have to choose between hypothetical allocations of experimental
Coins between yourself and another. Please select for each row, which option you prefer.
(1) Option A: You: 18.5 Coins, Other: 9 Coins Option B: You: 17 Coins, Other: 5 Coins
(2) Option A: You: 18.5 Coins, Other: 9 Coins Option B: You: 17 Coins, Other: 5 Coins
(3) Option A: You: 18.5 Coins, Other: 9 Coins Option B: You: 17 Coins, Other: 5 Coins
(4) Option A: You: 18.5 Coins, Other: 9 Coins Option B: You: 17 Coins, Other: 5 Coins
(5) Option A: You: 18.5 Coins, Other: 9 Coins Option B: You: 17 Coins, Other: 5 Coins
(6) Option A: You: 18.5 Coins, Other: 9 Coins Option B: You: 17 Coins, Other: 5 Coins
(7) Option A: You: 18.5 Coins, Other: 9 Coins Option B: You: 17 Coins, Other: 5 Coins
(8) Option A: You: 18.5 Coins, Other: 9 Coins Option B: You: 17 Coins, Other: 5 Coins
(9) Option A: You: 18.5 Coins, Other: 9 Coins Option B: You: 17 Coins, Other: 5 Coins
(10) Option A: You: 18.5 Coins, Other: 9 Coins Option B: You: 17 Coins, Other: 5 Coins
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